Issue		Petitioners' Proposed Contract		Verizon's Proposed Contract	
No.	Statement of Issue	Language	Petitioners' Rationale	Language	Verizon VA Rationale
			Network Architecture		
VII-2	Should the Parties' interconnection agreement reflect their recent agreement on Demand Management Forecasts	AT&T Proposed § 10.4 of the Verizon/AT&T Agreement.	Resolved.		
VII-3	How should the Parties Define "Interconnection Points" ("IP") and "Points of Interconnection" ("POI")?	AT&T Proposed §§ 4.1.and Schedule 4 of Verizon/AT&T Agreement Refer to the language cited in the discussion of Issue I-1.	This Issue is addressed in the Revised Direct Testimony of David L. Talbott and John D. Schell, Jr. at 134-135. It is virtually the same issue as Issue VII-1, and is closely related to the issues discussed in Issues I.1, VII-4 and VII-5.  AT&T rejects Verizon's assertion that the Parties ever came to an agreement on the terms POI and IP. There is, and has been since the inception of negotiations, a fundamental disagreement on the substance of these terms and the consequences flowing from the use of these terms. Verizon is simply trying to promote its unsupportable position that AT&T absorb a part of the costs of bringing Verizon customer calls to AT&T customers.  As shown in Issues VII-1 and Issue I.1, by using the term "IP" in its Contract language Verizon attempts to sever from "POI" the financial responsibility of each carrier to deliver its originating traffic to that point. AT&T has shown that the ability to determine the POI is inextricably linked to the responsibility to pay for the transport	1.46 "IP" or "Interconnection Point" means the point at which a Party who receives Local Traffic originating on the network of the other Party assesses Reciprocal Compensation charges for the further transport and termination of that Local Traffic. It also means the point on the terminating Party's network to which the originating Party is financially responsible to deliver its Local Traffic for completion.  1.63 "Point of Interconnection" or "POI" means the physical location where the originating Party's facilities physically interconnect with the terminating Party's facilities for the purpose of exchanging traffic.  4.1.2 Points of Interconnection. As and to the extent required by Section 251 of the Act, the Parties shall provide Interconnection of their networks at any technically feasible point, as described in Section 4.2. To the extent the originating Party's Point of Interconnection ("POI") is not located at the receiving Party's relevant Interconnection Point ("IP"),	Prior to the Commission filing, both Verizon VA and AT&T's interconnection agreements defined POI as the physical location where the Parties exchanged traffic and the IP as the point where financial responsibility changes hands. Nevertheless, with this filing, AT&T has changed its mind. It now defines the POI as the physical place where the Parties exchange traffic and the point where financial responsibility changes hands.  Verizon VA defines the POI, as did AT&T prior to filing its Petition, as the place where the ILEC and CLEC physically interconnect their respective networks. An IP is the place in the network at which one local exchange carrier hands over financial responsibility for traffic to another local exchange carrier. A POI and an IP may be at the same place but do not have to be. Pursuant to Verizon VA's proposal, Verizon VA is financially responsible for delivering its traffic to the CLEC's IP. Once Verizon VA delivers traffic originating on its network to the CLEC's IP, then the CLEC is responsible for transporting the traffic

Issue		Petitioners' Proposed Contract		Verizon's Proposed Contract	
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			Network Architecture	. 3	
			to that point. Verizon's insistence on maintaining the term "IP" in its proposed Contract language is nothing more than an attempt by Verizon to distract the Commission from following clear precedent establishing that the location of the POI, which is to be selected by the CLEC, is also the location where parties must deliver their originating traffic for termination and bear the costs of doing so.  There is no support for the distinction that Verizon attempts to make. Verizon has not pointed (and cannot point) to a single statutory or FCC citation that addresses the two terms and describes the differences between them. Indeed, no such citations exist. In contrast, there is ample support for AT&T's position. This is covered in detail in Issue 1.1.	the originating Party is responsible for transporting its traffic from its POI to the receiving Party's relevant IP.  4.1.3 Interconnection Points. Each Party is responsible for delivering its Local Traffic that is to be terminated by the other Party to the other Party's relevant IP. The originating Party will be responsible for providing transport on its side of the other Party's IP and the terminating party will be responsible for providing transport on its side of its IP, and the cost of such transport will be recovered through reciprocal compensation.	to its customer. AT&T should not be able to thwart negotiations that have proved fruitful for more than a year and interject new contract definitions at the last minute.  Verizon VA Direct Testimony on Non-Mediation Issues, pages 4-16; Verizon VA Rebuttal Testimony on Non-Mediation Issues, pages 2-11.
VII-4	If AT&T fails to establish an Interconnection Point in accordance with the terms of the interconnection agreement, what reciprocal compensation rates and/or intercarrier compensation rates should Verizon pay AT&T?	Refer to Verizon's Proposed change to Section § 4.2.7 attached to the Verizon/AT&T Agreement.  AT&T Proposed Schedule 4 attached to the Verizon/AT&T Agreement.	These Issues are addressed in the Revised Direct Testimony of David L. Talbott and John D. Schell, Jr.at 136-140.  These two issues are related because they both represent another attempt by Verizon to limit its obligations for delivering its traffic to the designated end user. These issues also both serve as prime examples as to how Verizon's use of the term "IP" results in diminishing AT&T's rights under	4.1.3.4 At any time that AT&T establishes a Collocation site at a Verizon End Office, then either Party may request that such AT&T Collocation site be established as the AT&T-IP for traffic originated by Verizon Customers served by that End Office. Such request shall be negotiated pursuant to the Joint Grooming Plan process, and approval shall not be unreasonably withheld or delayed. To the extent that the Parties have already	In conjunction with Verizon VA's response and proposal to Issue I-1, Verizon VA proposes contract language that addresses what reciprocal compensation rates apply as a result of AT&T's choices in determining geographically relevant interconnection points. Verizon VA's proposed contract offers AT&T choices in determining its IPs at Verizon VA tandem locations. If AT&T fails to establish an IP within a commercially reasonable period of

Issue		Petitioners' Proposed Contract		Verizon's Proposed Contract	
No.	Statement of Issue	Language	Petitioners' Rationale	Language	Verizon VA Rationale
1.0			Network Architecture		
			the law.	implemented network	time, Verizon VA should not be
ł (				Interconnection in a LATA at a	required to absorb the transport costs
1 [			In Section 4.1.2 of its proposed	point that is not geographically	resulting from AT&T's choices.
			contract draft, Verizon provides that	relevant (as that term is described	
		1	it shall permit AT&T to interconnect	above) or another AT&T-IP, then	Contrary to AT&T's claims, there is
1 1			at any technically feasible point (POI)	upon Verizon's request for a	nothing "reciprocal" or "mutual"
1 1		ļ	on Verizon's network. However, in	geographically relevant AT&T-IP	about AT&T's proposal. If the
1 1			Verizon's view, it should have no	at such End Office Collocation, the	Commission accepts AT&T's
1 1			financial obligation to provide	Parties shall negotiate a mutually-	proposal, AT&T will have the
1 1			interconnection facilities between the	acceptable transition process and	unilateral ability to pick its POI, and
1 1			Verizon-designated "IP" and the	schedule to implement the	if AT&T chooses not to "mutually
!!!			POI. Thus, the POI chosen by AT&T	requested geographically-relevant	agree" to the POI designated by
1 1		1	under Verizon's proposal has no	IPs. If AT&T should fail to	Verizon VA, AT&T chooses where
1 1			relation to the point where transport	establish an IP at an End Office	that point or points will be located.
1 1			and termination costs begin. Through	Collocation site pursuant to	Because Verizon VA has more places
[ {		l l	these two issues, Verizon wants to	Verizon's request, or if the Parties	on its network from which AT&T can
1			saddle AT&T with its transport	have been unable to agree upon a	pick and choose where to deliver its
1			obligations to deliver its traffic to	schedule for completing a transition	originating traffic, AT&T can limit its
]			AT&T.	from existing arrangements to	transport costs. It limits its transport
} }				geographically-relevant AT&T-IPs	costs because with more points at
			Verizon's proposal in Issue VII-4 is	or to an End Office Collocation site	which AT&T can "drop off" its
		İ	designed to reduce AT&T's	AT&T-IP within sixty (60) days	originating traffic, the fewer miles its
			reciprocal compensation rates if	following Verizon's request, AT&T	traffic travels before it is handed off.
]			AT&T does not establish a POI at	shall bill and Verizon shall pay the	When AT&T's originating traffic
			each applicable end office where	applicable Local Call Termination	only has to travel a few miles, it
			Verizon can hand off its traffic to	End Office rate for the relevant	follows that the transport expenses
<b>!</b>			AT&T. Specifically, if AT&T does not	NPA-NXX, as set forth in Exhibit	will be less costly. Verizon VA's
			choose to allow Verizon to deliver all	A, less Verizon's monthly recurring	proposal is meant to cushion the
			its traffic to Verizon's designated IP	rate for unbundled Dedicated	financial "blow" Verizon VA would
			for AT&T to pick up, then Verizon	Transport from Verizon's	incur if AT&T's position is adopted.
] ]			proposes to pay the lesser of the End	originating End Office to the	Verizon VA's GRIP and VGRIP
			Office reciprocal compensation rate	AT&T-IP.	proposals provide both Parties with
			for relevant traffic, or the applicable		choices such that each Party takes
			intercarrier compensation rate minus		responsibility for the origination,
			a transport "offset" equal to		transport, and termination of its
			Verizon's monthly recurring rate for		traffic.

Issue		Petitioners' Proposed Contract	1	Verizon's Proposed Contract	
No.	Statement of Issue	Language	Petitioners' Rationale	Language	Verizon VA Rationale
			Network Architecture		
No.	Statement of Issue	Language	1	Language	Verizon VA Rationale  Verizon VA Direct Testimony on Non-Mediation Issues, pages 15-18; Verizon VA Rebuttal Testimony on Non-Mediation Issues, pages 11-13.
			[A]sate commission shall not consider the terms and conditions for reciprocal compensation to be just and reasonable unlesssuch terms and conditions provide for the mutual and reciprocal recovery by each carrier of costs associated with the transport an termination on each carrier's		

Issue		Petitioners' Proposed Contract		Verizon's Proposed Contract				
No.	Statement of Issue	Language	Petitioners' Rationale	Language	Verizon VA Rationale			
	Network Architecture							
			network facilities of					
			calls that originate					
		1	on the network	į				
			facilities of the					
			other carrier.					
			Verizon's proposal in Issue VII-5					
ļ			provides Verizon with yet another way					
			to reduce its financial obligations to					
			deliver traffic to a POI. Verizon					
J			proposes that in instances when					
į.		1	Verizon decides to purchase transport					
1			from the "POI to an AT&T IP" (that					
1			is, purchase transport to a POI), if					
ı			AT&T selects a limited number of					
1			locations for Verizon to deliver its					
			traffic, then Verizon should not have					
ł			to pay AT&T any distance-sensitive					
ì			charges incurred by AT&T for this	]				
ı			transport. Verizon Supplemental	į.				
			Statement at 34.					
			Through this proposal, Verizon is					
1			seeking to shift its costs of origination					
ł.			to AT&T by refusing to pay AT&T the	<b>\</b>				
			costs it would incur should Verizon					
Ī		<b>\</b>	use AT&T facilities to deliver its					
			traffic to the POI. As shown in Issue					
			I.1, each Party has a financial					
			obligation to deliver its originating					
			traffic to the POI. This obligation					
			includes fully compensating the other					
			Party for any costs that party incurs					
			to deliver the other party's					
			originating traffic. Verizon's					
			proposal is inconsistent with this					

Issue		Petitioners' Proposed Contract		Verizon's Proposed Contract	
No.	Statement of Issue	Language	Petitioners' Rationale	Language	Verizon VA Rationale
			Network Architecture		
			obligation.		
			Moreover, Verizon's proposal is not reciprocal in nature. Rather, as shown in Issue V.2, Verizon proposes that it should be able to charge AT&T distance-sensitive, market-based, exchange access rates — Verizon's highest tariffed rate — whenever AT&T purchases transport from Verizon for the same purpose. The inequities of these two proposals taken together are obvious.  AT&T's proposal provides both Parties with the right to be fully and fairly compensated for any costs incurred by it when providing transport for the other parties originating traffic. AT&T's proposed Contract language provides each Party the ability to control its costs by choosing to build its own transport facilities or to lease them from the		
VII-5	When AT&T offers a limited number of IPs, should AT&T charge Verizon distance sensitive charges if Verizon purchases transport to an AT&T IP?	Refer to Verizon's Proposed change to Section § 4.2.7 attached to the Verizon/AT&T Agreement.  AT&T Proposed of Schedule 4attached to the Verizon/AT&T Agreement.	other Party.  See Rationale for Issue VII-4.	4.2.7 AT&T shall charge Verizon no more than a non-distance sensitive Entrance Facility charge as provided in Exhibit A for the transport of traffic from a Verizon POI to an AT&T-IP in any given LATA.	In those instances when Verizon VA must purchase transport from the POI to an AT&T IP, it may have to provide transport over a significant distance. As a result of the imbalance between the number of AT&T IPs and Verizon VA IPs, Verizon VA should not have to bear additional distance-sensitive charges.
	CDE DIGHTY				As previously explained, Verizon

Issue		Petitioners' Proposed Contract		Verizon's Proposed Contract	
No.	Statement of Issue	Language	Petitioners' Rationale	Language	Verizon VA Rationale
			Network Architecture		
					VA should be permitted to request an IP at a collocation cage at the end office if the Petitioner has a collocation site at that location. The CLECs should be financially responsible for the transport from the collocation site to its switch. If the Commission disagrees with Verizon VA's position and makes Verizon VA financially responsible for delivering its originating traffic to the POI when Petitioners establish one POI anywhere in the LATA, which it should not, then Verizon VA should not have to pay a distance sensitive rate element. Verizon VA's proposal limits the amount a CLEC could charge to a non-distance sensitive entrance facility charge. This is only fair for the same reasons Verizon VA provides in support of its position on Issue I-1. Verizon VA is limited in its options with respect to where it can deliver its originating traffic and should not bear the financial consequences resulting from a CLEC's decision to select a distant POI.  Verizon VA Direct Testimony on Non-Mediation Issues, pages 15-18; Verizon VA Rebuttal Testimony on
VII-6	Should Verizon be forced to offer	Verizon Proposed § 5.2.1 of the	This Issue is addressed in the Revised	5.2.1 Traffic Exchange Trunk	Non-Mediation Issues, pages 11-13.  The inclusion of § 5.2.1 is necessary
	interconnection facilities and hubbing	Verizon/AT&T Agreement is as	Direct Testimony of David L. Talbott	group connections will be made at a	because not all Verizon VA central
	at central offices other than those	<u> </u>	and John D. Schell, Jr. at 141-146	DS-1 or DS-3 level. Higher speed	offices are intermediate hub locations

Issue		Petitioners' Proposed Contract		Verizon's Proposed Contract	
No.	Statement of Issue	Language	Petitioners' Rationale	Language	Verizon VA Rationale
			Network Architecture		
			There can be no question that Verizon		is not a designated intermediate hub,
			is capable of providing a DS-3		Verizon VA may not have sufficient
1			interface at each Verizon serving wire		interoffice facilities from that office
			center.		to get to other offices in the LATA.
					Contrary to AT&T's claims, Verizon
1			Commission precedent supports		VA has made substantial
ı			AT&T's position that Verizon must		accommodations to its network
1			accept AT&T's interconnection traffic		architecture and facilities. In doing
			at a DS-3 level at a particular end		so, Verizon VA expects that AT&T
			office even if it has not traditionally		will go to the NECA 4 Tariff to find
1			accepted traffic at the DS-3 level at a		out where Verizon VA has the
1			particular location in the past. The		necessary equipment to handle
			Local Competition Order addresses		AT&T's interconnection request.
į.			this precise issue. In that Order, the		This is entirely consistent with
ĺ			Commission found as follows (at ¶		AT&T's practice as an IXC when
Į.			202, emphasis supplied):		purchasing access using multiplexed
					DS-3 facilities.
			[1]nterconnecting or providing access		
			to a LEC network element may be		Verizon VA Direct Testimony on
1			feasible at a particular point even if		Non-Mediation Issues, pages 32-34;
İ			such interconnection or access		Verizon VA Rebuttal Testimony on
Ì			requires a novel use of, or some		Non-Mediation Issues, pages 18-19.
l			modification to, incumbent LEC		
1			equipment. This interpretation is		
			consistent with the fact that incumbent		
ł			LEC networks were not designed to		
1			accommodate third-party		
1			interconnection or use of network		
l			elements at all or even most points		
			within the network. If incumbent		
1			LECs were not required, at least to		
[			some extent, to adapt their facilities		
1			to interconnection or use by other		
1			carriers, the purposes of sections		
1			251(c)(2) and 251(c)(3) would often		
			be frustrated. For example, Congress		

Issue		Petitioners' Proposed Contract	T	Verizon's Proposed Contract	
No.	Statement of Issue	Language	Petitioners' Rationale	Language	Verizon VA Rationale
			Network Architecture		
l			intended to obligate the incumbent to		
ł			accommodate the new entrant's		
			network architecture by requiring the		
			incumbent to provide interconnection		
			"for the facilities and equipment" of		
1		Ì	the new entrant. Consistent with that		
			intent, the incumbent must accept		
			the novel use of, and modification to,		
Į			its network facilities to accommodate		
			the interconnector or to provide		
			access to unbundled elements.		
			Therefore, the Commission should		
			reject Verizon's proposed language		
			on legal grounds alone.'		
1			Moreover, as shown in Issue III.3, the		
}			right to require interconnection at any		
1			technically feasible point also		
			includes the right to require any		
1			technically feasible method of		
i			interconnection. The Commission		
			made this clear in the Local		
			Competition Order when it found (at		
			¶ 549):		
1			We conclude that under Sections		
			251(c)(2) and 251(c)(3) any		
			requesting carrier may choose any		
			method of technically feasible		
			interconnection or access to		
			unbundled network elements at a		
			particular point. Section 251(c)(2)		
			imposes an interconnection duty at		
			any technically feasible point; it does		
KEN NUM			not limit that duty to a specific method		

Issue		Petitioners' Proposed Contract	T	Verizon's Proposed Contract	
No.	Statement of Issue	Language	Petitioners' Rationale	Language	Verizon VA Rationale
			Network Architecture		
			of interconnection or access to		
1			unbundled network elements.		
1					
ŀ			The DS-3 interface is a technically		
			feasible and economical method of		
]			interconnection. The interconnection		
			of two networks is a multi-		
		Į.	dimensional task. There is a		
			geographic aspect, e.g., at which		
			central office. There is a logical		
ł			aspect, e.g., how will traffic be routed		
Į.			under various traffic load conditions.		
		Į.	And there is the aspect relating to the		
i			method of interconnection, that		
Į.			includes, the interface selection,		
-			transmission protocol, transmission		
}			speed and the physical connection.		
1			Implementing current, SONET-based		
j			transmission systems, two interfaces	ì	
1			stand out as the most economical and		
- [			prevalent among local carriers. They		
ļ			are DS-1 and DS-3. A DS-1 interface		
			is most economical in situations with		
			relatively low volumes of traffic.	\ 	
l			However, once a certain location		
			reaches several DS-1s of demand,		
1			substantial savings can be realized by		
ŀ			utilizing a DS-3 interface. This		
Į į			threshold is frequently reached when	į l	
			the demand for access to UNEs and		
1			network interconnection are		
ļ			considered collectively. These		
			savings may come in the form of		
			lower leased facility rates and/or the		
1			elimination of DS-1 to DS-3	1	
			multiplexing and cross connecting		

Issue		Petitioners' Proposed Contract		Verizon's Proposed Contract	
No.	Statement of Issue	Language	Petitioners' Rationale	Language	Verizon VA Rationale
			Network Architecture		
			equipment. AT&T makes substantial		
			use of DS-3 interfaces across all of its		
			local networks with many ILECs.		
			If the Commission were to adopt		
			Verizon's proposal to limit DS-3	ŀ	
			interfaces only to Verizon-designated		
			locations, then AT&T may be faced		
1			with having to use more expensive		
			DS-1 facilities in lieu of DS-3		
			facilities, or to misroute traffic to a		
			more distant location to use a DS-3		
			facility. In either case, AT&T would		
			be forced to deploy a less efficient	· ·	
			interconnection arrangement than it		
]			would without Verizon's proposed		
			limitation. This would be particularly	]	
			troublesome since the additional costs		
			AT&T would bear under this		
			limitation would likely be additional		
			revenue to Verizon in the form of	į	
1			higher leased facility costs to AT&T.	1	
			Thus, Verizon's proposal provides it		
1			with a double incentive; first, to limit		
1			DS-3 interconnection which will		
1			increase its revenue, and second, to		
			diminish the network efficiencies of its		
			competitors.		
ļ					
			ENDNOTES	]	
			1/Verizon's assertion that AT&T's		
			refusal to limit its interconnection		
			options is somehow wrong because it		
1			is inconsistent with its practice as an	[	
l			IXC is without merit. See, Verizon	]	
			IAC is wilnout meril. See, verizon		

Issue No.	Statement of Issue	Petitioners' Proposed Contract Language	Petitioners' Rationale	Verizon's Proposed Contract Language	Verizon VA Rationale
			Network Architecture	The state of the s	
			Supplemental Statement at 35. It is well recognized that AT&T has different rights as a local exchange carrier under the Act, than it does an interexchange carrier. IXC practices are not relevant to this issue		
VII-7	Should AT&T deliver untranslated 8YY traffic to the appropriate Verizon access tandem?	This issue has been resolved between AT&T and Verizon.	Resolved.		Resolved.